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Abstract 
Hypervigilance to threat and difficulty disengaging attention from threat are features 
of attentional biases in anxiety. However, research has not investigated both of these 
biases in specific fear. This study investigated attentional biases in 13 females with 
high spider fear and 10 low-fear controls aged between 18-30 years. Participants 
completed a spatial cueing task with spider and cow images as cues appearing in 
either the same location (valid) or in the opposite location (invalid) as the following 
target which required a button-press response. The hypotheses that high-fear 
participants would display hypervigilance through shorter reaction times and greater 
P1 amplitude to targets with valid-spider cues, and disengagement difficulties 
through greater reaction times and decreased P1 amplitude to targets with invalid-
spider cues were not supported. Greater reaction times following all cues were 
observed in high-fear participants. High fear participants displayed similar P1 
amplitude to all targets regardless of cue whereas low-fear controls displayed 
increased P1 amplitude to spider-cued targets. Findings were interpreted as two 
processes in high-fear participants; general hypervigilance, suggested by generally 
increased P1 amplitude, followed by interference in reactions to targets. The P1 
amplitude displayed in the low-fear group may suggest an evolutionary mechanism. 
These results may suggest a focus on general hypervigilance in spider-fear treatment. 
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When faced with a threatening stimulus, it is adaptive to automatically attend 
to the threat with high priority so as to respond appropriately and effectively (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007). Many 
researchers have demonstrated that this phenomenon is more pronounced in people 
with anxiety disorders, such that they display an attentional bias towards threat-
related stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010). It has been suggested that the attentional 
system of individuals with anxiety disorders is distinctly sensitive, or biased, towards 
threat-related stimuli, such that a stimulus that is perceived as threatening is given 
priority and attentional resources are allocated towards it (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Researchers have identified a number of possible attentional mechanisms supporting 
this attentional bias (Fox, 1993). 
Two prominent attentional mechanisms that have been investigated are an 
increased sensitivity towards threat-related stimuli, also known as hypervigilance, 
and a difficulty in disengaging attention from threat-related stimuli despite other 
cognitive goals (Cisler & Koster, 2010). These mechanisms have been studied 
mostly in trait anxiety, and rarely studied in specific phobia; therefore, it is unknown 
whether these mechanisms generalise to specific fear. Further, there is minimal 
research investigating the event-related potentials (ERPs) associated with 
hypervigilance and little to no research investigating the ERPs associated with 
disengagement difficulties in specific fear. Hypervigilance to threat and difficulty 
disengaging attention from threat in specific fear is important to research as fear of 
spiders is a common phobia in Western culture with a prevalence rate of 3.5% in the 
general population (Hooper, Davies, Davies, & McHugh, 2011) Therefore, the 
present study will utilise a modified spatial cueing paradigm to measure behavioural 
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and electrophysiological indices of hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties in 
individuals with a high fear of spiders compared to low fear controls. 
Attentional Bias 
 Attentional biases refer to the tendency to prioritise the attentional processing 
of threat-related stimuli among concurrent neutral stimuli in the environment 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). There is evidence based on a number 
of different research measures that attentional biases play a major role in the etiology 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders including specific phobia (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Eysenck, 1992; Williams, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1996). Two attentional bias 
mechanisms that are suggested to occur in anxiety are hypervigilance to threat, and 
difficulty disengaging from threat; however there is still controversy regarding which 
of these processes are occurring. Petersen and Posner’s Attention Network Model 
(2012) provides a framework for understanding the mechanisms of hypervigilance 
and disengagement difficulty in attentional bias. 
Attention Network Model 
Petersen and Posner (2012) propose a model of attention comprising 
functionally and anatomically distinct networks of attention. This model provides the 
distinction between automatic and controlled attention processes which assists with 
the delineation of underlying attentional mechanisms involved in attentional biases. 
Three interacting networks of attention are proposed in the model; an alerting, an 
orienting, and an executive network. Alerting is defined as maintaining an 
appropriate level of alertness to allow for the processing of stimuli. Orienting 
involves selective attention to important sensory information. Executive control is 
involved in resolving response conflict and control of voluntary action (Fan et al., 
2002; Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas, & Lupiáñez, 2010). The orienting network 
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is implicated in hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties as they involve the 
shifting of attention in order to process stimuli that are salient in the environment. 
(Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014). Further discussion of alerting and 
executive control are beyond the scope of the present study. 
Orienting Network. As the cognitive system is unable to process all sensory 
stimuli, the orienting system is responsible for selectively attending to goal-relevant 
stimuli to process this information further, while ignoring irrelevant stimuli in the 
environment (Richards et al., 2014). The orienting system works by disengaging 
attention from one location, shifting attention from this location, and engaging 
attention on goal-relevant stimuli (Posner & Petersen, 1989). These processes can be 
either conscious or unconscious (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and orienting can be 
overt or covert in nature (Richards et al., 2014). 
Overt orienting involves moving the eyes to a location to engage attention 
onto a particular stimulus. In contrast, covert orienting is attending to a location 
without moving the eyes (Richards et al., 2014). Overt and covert orienting are 
driven by both stimulus-driven and goal-directed attentional processes (Richards et 
al., 2014). Stimulus-driven processes are guided based solely on the properties of the 
stimulus whereas goal-directed processes involve the allocation of attention based on 
goals, beliefs and expectations (Yantis, 1993). 
Two networks have been suggested to be involved in stimulus and goal-
directed visual processing; the dorsal fronto-parietal network and the ventral fronto-
parietal network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner & Petersen, 1989). The dorsal 
fronto-parietal network consists of the frontal eye fields, the intraparietal sulcus and 
the superior parietal lobe (Petersen & Posner, 2012). This network is a goal-directed 
attention system which is involved in the selection of goal-relevant stimuli (Corbetta 
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& Shulman, 2002). The ventral fronto-parietal network is right-lateralised (Richards 
et al., 2014) and consists of the temporoparietal junction and the ventral frontal 
cortex (Petersen & Posner, 2012). The ventral fronto-parietal network is involved in 
stimulus-driven attention and is employed when salient sensory stimuli are detected 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). These two systems interact such that the ventral fronto-
parietal network is able to override the goal-directed functioning of the dorsal fronto-
parietal network when salient stimuli requiring quick processing appear in the 
environment (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
The attentional control theory of anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007) reinforces the 
idea that goal directed functioning of the dorsal fronto-parietal network is overridden 
by the stimulus-driven processing of the ventral fronto-parietal network due to a lack 
of attentional control. Attentional control refers to the ability to regulate the orienting 
of attention to task-relevant stimuli and override dominant responses (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010). According to Eysenck et al., impairment in attentional control results 
in hypervigilance to threat due an increased influence of stimulus-driven attention 
processes in people with anxiety disorders. Subsequently, this lack of attentional 
control may also result in difficulties disengaging attention from threat-stimuli to 
engage in goal-directed tasks (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Hypervigilance and Disengagement Difficulties 
Many researchers agree that an increased influence of stimulus-driven 
attention is a main cause of the attention biases in orienting processes observed in 
people with anxiety disorders (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). It is less clear, 
however, whether this attention bias is driven by hypervigilance or disengagement 
difficulties. Researchers generally suggest that either one or the other is occurring 
rather than both biases simultaneously. According to the attentional control theory 
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(Eysenck et al., 2007), it is likely that both of these processes are occurring with an 
initial hypervigilance followed by difficulty disengaging attention from perceived 
threat. 
Hypervigilance. Hypervigilance describes the oversensitivity of attention 
towards threat-related stimuli which involves a tendency to constantly scan the 
environment for potential threats (Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). Any information that is 
perceived as potentially dangerous is prioritised in attention such that it is oriented to 
more readily relative to other stimuli in the environment (Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
As a result of this constant scanning, there is an increased distraction from the goal-
focussed attentional processes of the executive network (Eysenck et al., 2007; 
Petersen & Posner, 2012). 
According to Eysenck (1992), hypervigilance tendencies can be a 
vulnerability factor for clinical anxiety considering the way it reflects appraisals of 
the environment as being much more threatening than normal. Therefore, 
understanding the way hypervigilance manifests may have clinical implications for 
people with anxiety disorders. Two manifestations of hypervigilance have been 
proposed by Eysenck (1992); general and specific hypervigilance. General 
hypervigilance refers to a propensity to orient to any task-irrelevant stimuli in the 
environment causing a general distractibility. This was supported by Kolassa, 
Musial, Kolassa, and Miltner (2006) who found that participants with a high fear of 
spiders were generally faster to name the colour of, and identify, both spider and 
flower stimuli compared to low fear controls. 
Specific hypervigilance refers to a narrowing of attention and an increased 
propensity to preferentially attend to threat-related rather than neutral stimuli 
(Eysenck, 1992). Specific hypervigilance was found in a study by Kolassa et al. 
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(2007) who found that people with a specific phobia of spiders were faster to 
discriminate spider stimuli compared to flower stimuli relative to low fear controls.  
Evidence of hypervigilance has been reinforced through neuropsychological 
research. 
In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, Lipka, Miltner, and 
Straube (2011) found increased left-amygdala activity in response to spider images 
for people with spider phobia suggesting that the amygdala plays a role in the 
processing of fear-related stimuli. This finding is supported by the results of Morris, 
Öhman and Dolan (1998) who found left-amygdala activity in response to conscious 
presentations of conditioned feared face stimuli, as well as right-amygdala activity to 
subliminally presented conditioned fear stimuli which suggests that the fear response 
of the amygdala is lateralised based on awareness of the stimulus. Amygdala activity 
following subliminal presentation of fear also suggests that the amygdala responds to 
threat automatically and prior to conscious awareness (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). 
The amygdala is suspected to be involved in hypervigilance based on its 
neural connections to the visual cortex (Davis & Shi, 1999) which modulate the 
processing of visual threat stimuli (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Using event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, 
and Dolan (2004) showed that when presented with fearful face stimuli, individuals 
with lesions in the amygdala did not show the same increased activation of the 
occipital cortex that was observed in healthy controls. Vuilleumier et al. suggested 
that upon exposure to emotional stimuli, the enhanced responses in the visual cortex 
observed in healthy controls were modulated by the amygdala.  
Hypervigilance has also been demonstrated in a number of different research 
paradigms, such that individuals with a specific fear of spiders are faster to detect 
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and react to spider stimuli (Kolassa et al., 2006; Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2006; Pflugshaupt et al., 2005; Soares, Esteves, & Flykt, 2009). Perhaps the 
most common paradigm is the dot-probe task which involves the presentation of a 
target dot appearing in a location that was previously occupied by one of two 
pictures; a threatening picture or a neutral picture (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). Consistently, research has shown that high fear relative to low fear 
participants show faster reaction times to targets replacing spider cues compared to 
neutral cues (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006). Visual search tasks 
have also been used to investigate hypervigilance showing that high fear participants 
were faster to detect spiders in an image of a neutral scene (Pflugshaupt et al., 2005) 
as well as in a grid of neutral distractors (Öhman et al., 2001). These findings 
provide evidence that hypervigilance manifests as facilitated attentional processing 
of threat-related compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010). However, 
while these studies provide evidence for hypervigilance, it is not possible to delineate 
whether fearful participants are faster to orient to the threat, or whether they are 
slower to disengage from the threat (Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013).  
Disengagement Difficulties. Disengagement difficulties refer to the way in 
which a threatening stimulus captures and holds attention impairing the ability to 
disengage attention away from the current stimulus and engage it in a new location 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010). This was explained by Fox, Russo, Bowles, and Dutton 
(2001) in the attention maintenance theory which posits that slower disengagement 
of attention from threat involves an increased dwell time on the threat stimulus 
resulting from deficits in inhibition and shifting attention from threat. 
Based on the results obtained from the dot-probe task, researchers concluded 
that the faster reaction times to probes replacing threat-related images compared to 
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probes replacing neutral images indicated that the fearful participants were 
hypervigilant to threat. This may be the case, however, the dot probe task does not 
allow for the distinction between hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties 
because the difference in reaction times between probes appearing in the same 
location as the threat-related image and probes replacing neutral images may be due 
to slowed reaction times (Clarke et al., 2013). It is possible that fearful individuals 
are slower to disengage attention from the threat, resulting in greater reaction times 
when the dot replaces the non-threatening target, rather than faster reaction times to 
threat-cued probes (Clarke et al., 2013). 
The spatial cueing task allows for a clearer assessment of the allocation of 
spatial attention (Cisler & Koster, 2010) as only a single pictorial cue (threat or 
neutral) is presented on each trial (Fox et al., 2001). In a spatial cueing task, 
participants focus on a central fixation point which is followed by the presentation of 
a cue. After the cue offset, a target then appears either in the same location as the 
previously displayed cue (a valid trial), or on the opposite side of the cue (an invalid 
trial). Participants are asked to respond to the target’s location by pressing one of two 
buttons (Posner, 1980). Hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties in response to 
threat can be investigated by using threatening and neutral images as cues (Fox et al., 
2001). Hypervigilance is evident when responses are faster on validly-cued 
threatening trials compared to validly-cued neutral trials. Difficulties in disengaging 
attention are evident following slower responses to invalid-threat trials compared to 
invalid-neutral trials as this slowed response suggests that the participant took longer 
to disengage attention from the threat and engage it in the location of the target 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
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Research using the spatial cueing task to investigate attentional bias has 
yielded different results. Vromen et al. (2014) used a spatial cueing task with four 
cue and target locations (at each point of the fixation cross) to investigate 
hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties in participants with a high and low 
fear of spiders. Participants were provided with different top-down cues which were 
followed by valid or invalid schematic spider or cat targets. They were required to 
identify either spiders or cats depending on the trial, and the one that was not a target 
served as a distractor. Results provided no evidence of hypervigilance because 
participants were not faster to identify spider compared to cat stimuli. Results also 
suggested that disengagement difficulties only occur when spiders were a part of the 
target set which suggests that stimulus-driven processing does not impair task 
performance as slowed response were only observed for target spiders, not distractor 
spiders. This was the only study to investigate attentional biases in spider fear using a 
spatial cueing task, but research into other forms of anxiety has been conducted.   
Fox and colleagues (2001) investigated attentional biases in trait-anxious 
individuals using an emotional spatial cueing task in which cues were neutral, 
positive, or threat-related schematic faces. High-anxious relative to low-anxious 
individuals were significantly slower to respond to invalidly cued targets following a 
threat-related cue than any other cue, thus, suggesting delayed disengagement from 
threatening images. These findings did not support hypervigilance as there was no 
difference between groups for the valid stimuli. Yiend and Matthews (2001) also 
found that high trait-anxious participants had greater reaction times to invalidly-cued 
threat trials in their spatial cueing paradigm consisting of threatening and neutral 
images presented 500ms before the target. 
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Further research has shown both hypervigilance and disengagement 
difficulties when manipulating the threat intensity of the cues as well as the duration 
of the image presentation. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, and 
Wiersema (2006) employed a modified spatial cueing task using neutral, highly and 
mildly threatening images. Participants with high-trait anxiety displayed 
hypervigilance to, and difficulty disengaging from, high-threat image cues, but 
showed only disengagement difficulties and not hypervigilance to mildly threatening 
cues. These results were found for 100ms cue durations but not for longer durations 
of 200ms and 500ms suggesting that hypervigilance is an early attentional process. 
Thus, it is possible that Yiend and Matthews (2001) did not find hypervigilance 
because their paradigm used 500ms durations during which time multiple attentional 
mechanisms may have occurred (Koster et al., 2006). Further, these results also 
suggest that hypervigilance occurs on exposure to highly, but not mildly, threatening 
stimuli. Accordingly, the schematic images used by Fox et al. (2001) may have 
resulted in participants not seeing the images as threatening, and thus, were not 
hypervigilant to them (Koster et al., 2006). Similarly, Vromen et al. (2014) may not 
have found impaired performance due to hypervigilance or disengagement 
difficulties as participants were not feeling threatened. This suggestion is reinforced 
based on their threat and arousal ratings; although spiders were rated as more 
threatening than cats, threat and arousal ratings for spider images were still very low.  
In summary, it is possible that the attention biases observed in specific fear 
may be the result of both hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties but previous 
research has not yet investigated both of these processes simultaneously in people 
with specific fear. This will be investigated in the present study by using highly 
threatening images and 100ms stimulus durations.  
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Electrophysiological Correlates of Attention 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) allow for a direct investigation of the neural 
activity associated with attentional mechanisms such as hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulties (Luck, 1995). Of particular importance to the current 
study is the occipital P1 ERP component. The P1 component is a positive component 
which peaks maximally at approximately 100ms post-stimulus (Salillas, Radouane, 
Yagoubi, & Semenza, 2008). The P1 component is modulated by attention processes, 
particularly covert visuospatial attention, and it is thought to reflect enhanced 
processing in extrastriate areas (Hillyard, Luck, & Mangun, 1994) such as the lateral 
occipital and inferior temporal cortex (Santesso et al., 2008). The P1 component is 
typically maximal over occipital regions and has been associated with early visual 
processing (Salillas et al., 2008) and involuntary orienting (Fu, Caggiano, 
Greenwood, & Parasuraman, 2005). Studies have also shown that P1 amplitude is 
greater following presentation of threat compared to neutral cues, and that this effect 
is larger in people with trait anxiety (Li, Li, & Luo, 2005). Based on these findings, 
the P1 amplitude is a possible index of hypervigilance (Hofmann, Ellard, & Siegle, 
2012). 
Hypervigilance. In multiple ERP studies, increased P1 amplitudes have been 
observed following exposure to threat-related stimuli in people with anxiety. There 
are no known studies to investigate specific fear using the dot-probe or spatial cueing 
paradigm; however Venettacci (2014) used a go/nogo flanker task to investigate 
hypervigilance in a sample with high and low fear of spiders. This task required 
participants to respond to a central stimulus which was either a schematic spider or 
flower by pressing a button when the central stimulus was green (go), but not when it 
was yellow (nogo). The central stimulus was either flanked by the same stimulus as 
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the central target (congruent), or different (incongruent). Results showed that 
participants with a high fear of spiders displayed significantly faster reaction times, 
and greater P1 amplitude, to all trials containing spider stimuli (Venettacci, 2014). 
Similarly, studies using the dot-probe paradigm have shown that people with social 
phobia display greater P1 amplitude to targets replacing angry/neutral face pairs 
compared to happy/neutral face pairs (Mueller et al., 2009). 
Disengagement Difficulties. There is no research investigating the ERP 
components implicated in disengagement difficulties. Considering greater P1 
amplitude has been observed for targets following valid-threatening cues as a result 
of rapid facilitated attentional engagement - that is, hypervigilance – perhaps targets 
requiring a rapid shift of attention from invalidly-cued threatening images to attend 
to the target would result in decreased P1 amplitude in people with a high fear of 
spiders due to a disruption in the shifting process because of disengagement 
difficulties. 
Rationale and Aim  
Many studies have investigated the attentional biases in specific fear and 
found mixed results. For example, research using the dot-probe task has found faster 
reaction times to probes replacing threatening spider stimuli compared to controls, 
however, this paradigm does not allow for the delineation of hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulties. That is, the difference in responses between congruent 
trials, or trials with the probe appearing in the same location as the threat-related 
image, and incongruent trials, or trials with the probe appearing on the opposite side 
of the image, could be due to hypervigilance, disengagement difficulties, or both. 
Evidence for both hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties has been found in 
trait-anxious samples, however, no studies are yet to replicate this finding in specific 
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fear samples.  Therefore it is not known whether these processes also occur in 
specific fear. Thus, the present study aimed to examine the attentional biases of 
hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties in participants with a specific fear of 
spiders. To disentangle the two biases, a modified spatial cueing task was used with 
stimulus presentations of 100ms and highly arousing spider images. Further, ERPs 
were obtained in order to examine the brain activity underlying hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulties in specific fear, a relatively novel subject in the field. 
Hypotheses 
Consistent with the commonly found validity effect displayed in anxiety in 
spatial cueing research, an interaction was hypothesised for behavioural data such 
that compared to controls, participants with a high fear of spiders would display 
faster reaction times to targets preceded by a valid-spider cue as a result of 
hypervigilance, and slower reaction times to targets preceded by an invalid-spider 
cue due to disengagement difficulties Reaction times to targets following neutral 
(cow) cues would be similar to the low fear group. In terms of electrophysiological 
responses, it was hypothesised that high fear participants would display 
hypervigilance as indexed by an increased P1 amplitude compared to low fear 
controls on valid trials cued by spider images. Finally, invalid targets requiring 
disengagement from the cue would result in significantly decreased amplitude of the 
P1 component in high fear compared to low fear controls on trials cued by spider 
images. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 32 females (17 high fear) aged 18-30 years (M=21.35, 
SD=3.38), 28 of which were psychology undergraduates receiving course credit to 
15 
 
 
 
participate, the remainder were volunteers known to the experimenters. Nine 
participants were excluded from analysis, four due to extreme outlying mean reaction 
times, three participants due to accuracy less than 70%, and two participants who had 
conflicting scores on the spider fear scales (such that one scale indicated high fear 
and the other indicated low fear). The final sample comprised 13 high fear 
participants and 10 low fear participants. 
Participants were recruited by means of posters displayed throughout the 
University of Tasmania and through the Division of Psychology research 
participation internet site. Participation in the study was based on scores from the 
Spider Phobia Questionnaire (Watts & Sharrock, 1984) with a median split (median 
value = 10) determining which group participants were placed in. All participants 
were given an information sheet and provided informed consent prior to 
participation. 
Participants were excluded if they had a history of medical, neurological, or 
mental disorders (other than anxiety and affective disorders), were users of illicit 
drugs within the last month, or more than ten times during their lifetime, users of 
psychoactive medications, and tobacco, were problem drinkers (evident in a score 
higher than 16 on the AUDIT; Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001), 
were psychologically distressed (evident in a score higher than 30 on the K10; 
Kessler et al., 2002), or were pregnant.  
Materials and Apparatus 
Questionnaire Measures. The Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & 
Sharrock, 1984) was used to screen phobia of spiders. The SPQ consists of 33 yes/no 
questions regarding responsiveness to spiders (e.g., “Do you check the lounge for 
spiders before sitting down?”). The questions measure dimensions of vigilance, 
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preoccupation and coping/avoidance in relation to spiders. Response bias is avoided 
through use of reversed scoring for five of the items. The SPQ has good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) and test-retest reliability (r =.94) (Watts & 
Sharrock, 1984). 
The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995) 
was used as a secondary measure of spider fear. The FSQ is a good measure of spider 
fear within low fear populations as its items are based on a restricted time period 
(Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). The FSQ is an 18-item questionnaire measuring 
responsiveness to spiders with questions (e.g., “If I saw a spider now, I would think it 
will harm me”). Answers are provided on a scale from 1(definitely not) to 7 
(definitely) with higher scores indicating increased intensity of spider phobia 
symptoms. The FSQ has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.97) and 
good test-retest reliability (r=0.94; Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). 
The Kessler Psychological Distress scale (K10; Kessler et al., 2002) is a 10-
item scale measuring psychological distress on a six point Likert scale from 1 (none 
of the time) to 6 (none of the time). Participants answer a series of questions 
regarding their experience of psychological distress within the last four weeks (e.g., 
“Did you feel so nervous that nothing could calm you down”). Scores range from a 
minimum of 10 to a maximum of 40 and participants were excluded if they reached a 
score of at least 30 which indicates a high risk of psychological distress. The K10 has 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93) (Kessler et al., 2002).  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y-2 (STAI; Speilberger, 1983) is a 
20-item scale which was used to assess trait anxiety. Answers are rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale (from “almost never” to “almost always”), with higher scores indicating 
higher trait anxiety. Items (e.g., “I lack self-confidence”) measure worry, stress and 
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discomfort (Speilberger et al., 1983). The STAI has good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90) and test-retest reliability for males (r=.68) and females 
(r=.65) (Speilberger et al., 1983). 
The Weschler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) is a test used to measure 
intellectual functioning (Wechsler, 2001). It consists of 50 irregularly spelled words 
which the participant is asked to pronounce correctly. Each correctly pronounced 
word gives a score of one, and the test is ended once the participant incorrectly 
answers 12 words incorrectly. The test has strong concurrent validity with scores 
correlating highly with measures of verbal comprehension (r = .74), verbal IQ (r = 
.75), and full-scale IQ (r=.73; Wechsler, 2001). 
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor et al., 2001) 
was used to screen for problematic alcohol consumption. The AUDIT is a 10-item 
screening test designed to measure alcohol consumption, alcohol dependence, and 
alcohol related problems across gender, age, and cultures. Two drinking frequency 
questions (e.g., “How many standard drinks do you have on a typical day when you 
are drinking?”) are rated on a 5-point scale from ‘1 or two’ to ‘10 or more’. Six 
drinking frequency questions (e.g., “How often do you have six or more standard 
drinks on one occasion?”) are rated on a five-point scale from ‘Never’ to ‘Daily or 
almost daily’. Two drinking severity questions (e.g., “Have you or someone else 
been injured because of your drinking?”) are rated on a three-point scale from ‘No’ 
to ‘Yes, during the last year’. A score of 16 and above indicates potential dependence 
on alcohol (Babor et al., 2001). 
A Video Gaming Experience Questionnaire (VGEQ) was custom made for 
the current study. The VGEQ comprised of one question asking participants how 
often they play video games. Participants answered either, never play video games, 
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rarely play video games (less than 2 hours a month), occasionally play video games 
(between 30 minutes and 2 hours a week), regularly play video games (between 2 
hours and 5 hours a week), or often play video games (more than 5 hours a week). 
This questionnaire does not have tested psychometric properties, but was 
administered in an attempt to test for potential confounds. For example, research 
suggests that video games improve visual attention, such that top-down processing is 
improved, resulting in enhanced goal focussed attention (Hubert‐Wallander, Green, 
& Bavelier, 2011). 
The Spatial Cueing Paradigm. The spatial cueing task was presented using 
NeuroScan STIM 3.1 software. At the beginning of the task, instructions were shown 
on the computer screen. Prior to the true experimental trials, 10 practice trials were 
presented. The test phase consisted of 128 trials presented in random order. Every 
trial included a white fixation cross presented in the middle of the screen for 500ms. 
Following the fixation cross, a pictorial cue (5.5 x 8cm) appeared for 100ms in either 
the left or right visual field, with the edge of the picture 1cm from the fixation cross. 
The pictorial cue was either a spider (threat-related) or a cow (neutral) image. These 
images had a creative commons license and were sourced from Flickr, a photo 
sharing website. Cues were either valid or invalid; that is, they either correctly or 
incorrectly indicated the location of the target. The target was validly cued on 50% of 
trials. Almost immediately (~12ms) after cue offset, a target was presented. The 
target was a white dot, measuring at 1cm in diameter, which remained on screen for 
2000ms or until a response was made. Left or right index finger responses were made 
via button press on a NeuroScan response pad for left and right visual field targets 
respectively. The next trial began immediately after a response was made. 
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Electrophysiological (EEG) recording. The EEG recording was obtained by 
means of the NeuroSCAN system (Scan 4.4 system) and 32-channel Quik-Cap with 
Ag/AgCl sintered electrodes. Using the international 10-20 system of electrode 
placement, continuous EEG data was recorded from 32 sites. Data was sampled 
continuously at a rate of 1000Hz. Electrode impedance was kept below 10kΩ. 
Electrodes were referenced to linked mastoids and also placed on the outer canthi of 
both eyes and the upper and lower left eye to measure horizontal and vertical electro-
oculographic (EOG) activity.  
In the editing phase, behavioural data was merged with continuous EEG data 
and then data was filtered using a Zero-phase-shift low pass filter (30Hz, 24 dB/Oct). 
Ocular artefact rejection was then undertaken to minimise the impact of eye blinks 
on the other electrode channels. Following this, epochs were extracted from the data 
from 200ms before stimulus onset to 900ms post stimulus. Subsequent artefact 
rejection and baseline correction was conducted with trials containing artefacts above 
70 μV and below -70 μV rejected. The occipital P1 component was determined from 
grand averaged waveforms for each condition and was defined as the maximum 
amplitude between 80-120ms post target onsets.  
Procedure 
 Ethics Approval was gained through the University of Tasmania Human 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix A) and each participant provided written 
informed consent (see Appendix B). Prior to the experimental session, participants 
were screened via an online survey to determine their demographics, fear of spiders, 
alcohol use, and psychological distress, and participants meeting inclusion criteria 
were invited to participate. Each participant completed a two hour experimental 
session. Upon arrival, participants completed a list of forms detailing their caffeine 
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intake, medication, the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) 
(see Appendix C), computer game usage (see Appendix D), menstrual cycle (see 
Appendix E), the STAI (Speilberger, 1983) and the WTAR (Wechsler, 2001). 
Participants were set up for the EEG recording and placed in front of a computer 50 
cm away from the screen. Participants completed the customised spatial cueing task. 
Following the completion of the spatial cueing task, participants were asked to rate 
the pictures presented in the task for valence (1=highly unpleasant to 9=highly 
pleasant) and arousal (1=low arousal to 9=highly arousing). To conclude the session, 
the participants were debriefed. 
Design and Data Analysis 
Data was assessed to ensure the assumptions of ANOVA were met. Mean 
valence and arousal ratings were analysed using two separate 2 (Group: high 
fear/low fear) x 2 (Image: spider/cow) mixed measures ANOVAs with Group as the 
between subjects factor, Image as the within-subjects factor. Mean reaction time was 
the dependent variable for the behavioural measures of hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulties. For analysis of mean RT (ms) and accuracy (percentage 
of correct trials) to target stimuli, a 2 (Group: high fear/low fear) x2 (Validity: 
valid/invalid) x2 (Image: spider/cow) mixed measures ANOVA was used, with 
Group as a between subjects factor and Validity and Image as within subjects factors.  
The electrophysiological dependent variable used to measure hypervigilance 
and disengagement difficulties was peak amplitude of the P1 ERP component. P1 
amplitude was analysed at the midline occipital site (Oz). For analysis of P1 
amplitude, a 2 (Group: high fear/low fear) x2 (Validity: valid/invalid) x2 (Image: 
spider/cow) mixed measures ANOVA was conducted, with Group as a between 
subjects factor and Validity and Image as within subjects factors. Significant 
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interactions were further analysed by examination of simple main effects with 
Bonferroni corrections to hold the type I error rate to less than 5% following multiple 
tests. Effects sizes were clarified with partial eta square for omnibus ANOVAs and 
Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992) for tests of simple effects. Cohen’s guidelines for 
interpretation were used (0.2=small, 0.5=medium, 0.8=large). 
Results 
Demographics 
Table 1 shows the mean age and mean raw scores on questionnaire measures 
for each group. There were no significant differences between the groups on age, 
trait anxiety (STAI), verbal intelligence (WTAR), psychological distress (K10), 
alcohol dependence (AUDIT) and sleepiness (Karolinska). As expected, there was a 
significant difference in spider fear between the groups such that the high fear group 
scored higher on measures of spider fear. For psychological distress (K10 scores) 
there was a trend towards significance such that the low fear group scored higher 
than the high fear group.   
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Table 1 
Mean Age and Raw Scores on Measures of Spider Fear, Anxiety, Reading Ability, 
Video Game Usage, and Alertness for High and Low Spider Fear Groups 
 Low Fear High Fear    
 M(SD) M(SD) F(1,21) p Cohen’s d 
Age 20.8 (2.15) 21.8 (4.13) 0.5 0.5 0.3 
SPQ/33 4.5 (1.27) 16.9 (4.43) 73.4 <.001 3.6 
FSQ/126 28.7 (9.63) 94.4 (17.64) 112.1 <.001 .05 
STAI 34.3 (5.08) 33.8 (8.53) 0.03 0.9 0.1 
WTAR 35.8 (7.29) 37.5 (6.03) 0.1 0.5 0.3 
K10 
AUDIT 
16.9 (4.53) 
5.7 (2.56) 
13.9 (3.62) 
4.6 (2.87) 
3.1 
0.9 
0.1 
0.4 
0.7 
0.2 
VGEQ 4.2 (1.29) 3.7(1.36) 0.01 0.5 0.3 
Karolinska 4.2 (1.29) 3.7 (1.36) 0.6 0.5 0.3 
 
Valence and arousal ratings 
 Table 2 shows the mean valence and arousal ratings for spider and cow 
images. Analysis of valence ratings revealed a significant main effect of Image such 
that both groups rated the spider images (M=3.34, SD=1.0) significantly less pleasant 
than the cow images (M=5.55, SD=.92), F(1,17)=42.80, p<.001, ηp
2
=.72. There was 
a non-significant main effect of Group, F(1,17)=4.38, p=.052, ηp
2
=.21, however there 
was a trend for significance such that the high fear group rated images to be less 
pleasant (M=4.16, SD=.58) than the low fear group (M=4.73, SD=.58). This trend 
was modified by a significant Group x Image interaction, F(1,17)=10.75, p=.004, 
ηp
2
=.39. Tests of simple effects revealed that while both groups rated the spider 
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images as more negative than the cow images, the high fear group rated the spiders 
as significantly more unpleasant than the low fear group, F(1,17)=12.52, p=.002, 
d=1.74, whereas ratings for the cows for the high fear group and the low fear group 
were not significantly different F(1,17)=1.68, p=.212, d=.61. Analysis of Arousal 
ratings revealed no significant difference in ratings as there was a non-significant 
main effects of Group, F(1,17)=2.36, p=.143, ηp
2
=.122, and Image, F(1,17)=3.92, 
p=.064, ηp
2
=.188, and a non-significant interaction between Group and Image, 
F(1,17)=.771, p=.392, ηp
2
=.043. 
 
Table 2 
Mean Valence and Arousal Ratings for Spider and Cow Images Used as Cues in the 
Task 
 Valence  Arousal 
 Spider Cow  Spider Cow 
 
Low Fear 
 
4.18 (0.96) 
 
5.29 (0.87) 
  
3.34 (1.82) 
 
1.87 (1.40) 
 
High Fear 2.50 (0.96) 5.82 (0.87)  3.77 (1.82) 3.20 (1.40) 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Accuracy 
Table 3 shows the mean accuracy of responses to targets following spider and 
cow cues during valid and invalid presentations. Analysis of accuracy (percentage of 
correct trials) showed a significant main effect of Image, F(1, 21)=4.50, p=.05, 
ηp
2
=.18, whereby participants were significantly less accurate when the cue was a 
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spider (M=97.4, SD=3.1), compared to when the cue was a cow (M=98.3, SD=2.3). 
Neither the Group, F(1,21)=.16, p=.70, ηp
2
=.01, nor Validity, F(1,21)=2.20, p=.15, 
ηp
2
=.10, main effects were significant. The Group x Validity interaction, 
F(1,21)=.12, p=.73, ηp
2
=.01, and the Group x Image interaction, F(1,21)=.89, p=.36, 
ηp
2
=.04, were non-significant. There was, however, a significant Validity x Image 
interaction F(1,21)=5.12, p=.03, ηp
2
=.20. Bonferroni corrected (α=.025) tests of 
simple main effects of Image at each level of Validity revealed that there was no 
differences in accuracy between spider (M=99.0, SD=1.9) and cow cues (M=98.1, 
SD=3.7) on valid trials (p=.243, d=.31). For invalid trials, responses were 
significantly less accurate following the spider (M=95.8, SD=6.3) compared to the 
cow (M=98.6, SD=2.7) cues (p=.014, d=.58). 
 
Table 3 
Mean Accuracy of Responses to Targets Following Spider and Cow Cues in Valid 
and Invalid Trials for High and Low Spider Fear Groups 
 Spider  Cow 
 Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid 
 
Low Fear 
 
99.3 (2.8) 
 
94.7 (9.4) 
  
97.7 (5.6) 
 
99.0 (4.0) 
 
High Fear 98.7 (2.5) 96.9 (8.3)  98.5 (4.9) 98.2 (3.5) 
Note. Means are presented as percentages. Standard deviations are presented in 
parentheses. 
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Reaction Time 
Table 4 shows the mean reaction times to targets following spider and cow 
cues during valid and invalid presentations. There was a significant main effect of 
Group, F(1,21)=4.65, p=.04, ηp
2
=.18, showing that the reaction times for the high 
fear group were significantly slower (M=331.3, SD=52.8) than reaction times for the 
low fear group (M=295.3, SD=60.1). The main effect of Validity was non-
significant, F(1,21)=2.87, p=.11, ηp
2
=.12, showing that reaction times to valid cues 
(M=307.9, SD=40.0) were not significantly different to reaction times to invalid cues 
(M=318.7, SD=45.5). The main effect of Image was significant, F(1,21)=5.99, p=.02, 
ηp
2
=.22, demonstrating that reaction times on trials cued by spider images were 
significantly faster (M=311.2, SD=39.4) than reaction times to cow images 
(M=315.4, SD=41.0). The Group x Validity interaction was non-significant, 
F(1,21)=.26, p=.61, ηp
2
=.01, as was the Group x Image interaction, F(1,21)<.001, 
p=.99, ηp
2
<.001, and the Validity x Image interaction, F(1,21)=1.29, p=.27, ηp
2
=.06. 
The Group x Validity x Image interaction was non-significant, F(1,21)=.05, p=.83, 
ηp
2
=.002. 
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Table 4 
Mean Reaction Time for Targets Following Spider and Cow Cues in Valid and 
Invalid Trials for High and Low Spider Fear Groups 
 Spider  Cow 
 Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid 
 
Low Fear 
 
285.3 (59.7) 
 
301.1 (70.1) 
  
291.2 (62.1) 
 
303.6 (67.7) 
 
High Fear 324.2 (52.3) 334.2 (61.5)  330.9 (54.5) 335.9 (59.4) 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Peak P1 Amplitude 
Table 4 shows the mean peak P1 amplitude to targets following spider and 
cow cues in valid and invalid trials for high and low fear groups. Figures 1 and 2 
show grand mean average wave forms at the midline occipital site (Oz) for low and 
high fear participants respectively. Figure 1 shows peak P1 amplitude (peaking at 
approx. 100ms) for low fear participants differed as a function of cue type such that 
targets following spider cues produced significantly greater P1 amplitude than targets 
following cow cues. Figure 2 demonstrates a similar peak P1 amplitude for the high 
fear group following the exposure to threat-related and neutral targets. 
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 Valid-spider   Valid Cow 
 Invalid-spider Invalid Cow 
Figure 1. Grand averaged waveforms for low fear participants at the midline 
occipital site (Oz) for valid and invalid threat-relevant and neutral cues. 
 
 
 Valid-spider   Valid Cow 
 Invalid-spider Invalid Cow 
Figure 2. Grand averaged waveforms for high fear participants at the midline 
occipital site (Oz) for valid and invalid threat-relevant and neutral cues. 
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The main effects of Group, F(1,21)=1.26, p=.28, ηp
2
=.06, Validity 
F(1,21)=.39, p=.54, ηp
2
=.02, and Image, F(1,21)=2.57, p=.12, ηp
2
=.11, were all non-
significant. The Group x Validity, F(1,21)=.57, p=.46, ηp
2
=.10, and the Validity x 
Image, F(1,21)=.06, p=.81, ηp
2
=.003, interactions were non-significant. A significant 
Group x Image interaction was revealed, F(1,21)=13.66, p=.001, ηp
2
=.39. Bonferroni 
corrected (α=.025) tests of simple main effects of Image were conducted for each 
group. As can be seen in Figure 3, the low fear group showed significantly greater P1 
amplitude to targets following the spider image (M=6.15, SD=3.36) compared to the 
cow image (M=4.59, SD=3.19), F(1,9)=12.36, p=.01, d=0.48. The high fear group 
did not show a significant difference in P1 amplitude between the spider (M=6.48, 
SD=3.29) and cow images (M=7.09, SD=3.14), F(1,12)=2.53, p=.14, d=0.19. 
Between the groups, P1 amplitude did not differ significantly for targets following 
spider images, F(1,21)=.06, p=.81, d=.10, or the cow images, F(1,21)=3.93, p=.06, 
d=.83, however there was a trend for significance such that high fear group displayed 
greater P1 amplitude to targets following cow images (M=7.09, SD=3.00) relative to 
the low fear group (M=4.59, SD=3.00). The Group x Validity x Image interaction 
was non-significant, F(1,21)=.01, p=.92, ηp
2
=.001. 
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Figure 3. Mean peak P1 amplitude for targets following spider and cow cues in low 
and high fear participants (error bars represent 95% CIs). 
 
Table 5 
Mean Peak P1 Amplitude to Targets Following Spider and Cow Cues in Valid and 
Invalid Trials for High and Low Spider Fear Groups 
 Spider  Cow 
 Valid Invalid  Valid Invalid 
 
Low Fear 
 
5.8 (3.5) 
 
6.5 (3.6) 
  
4.2 (3.4) 
 
5.0 (3.3) 
 
High Fear 6.6 (3.5) 6.4 (3.6)  7.1 (3.4) 7.1 (3.3) 
Note. Means are presented as percentages. Standard deviations are presented in 
parentheses. 
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Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate hypervigilance and 
disengagement difficulty biases in people with a high fear of spiders. The hypothesis 
that relative to low fear controls, participants with a high fear of spiders would 
display faster reaction times to targets preceded by a valid-spider cue as a result of 
hypervigilance, and slower reaction times to targets preceded by an invalid-spider 
cue as a result of difficulty disengaging was not supported as the Group x Validity x 
Image interaction was non-significant. In fact, high fear participants were slower to 
react to all targets relative to the low fear controls regardless of whether the cue was 
valid or invalid or a spider or cow. Also unexpectedly, both the high fear group and 
the low fear controls displayed significantly faster reaction times to targets preceded 
by spider images relative to cow images. 
The hypotheses that high fear participants would display greater P1 amplitude 
to targets following valid spider cues as evidence of hypervigilance and lower P1 
amplitude to targets following invalid spider cues as evidence of disengagement 
difficulties were not supported. Unexpectedly, the low fear group displayed 
significantly greater P1 amplitude for targets cued by spiders compared to cows, 
whereas the high fear group showed no difference in peak P1 amplitude to targets 
following spider or cow cues. 
Analysis of accuracy found no differences between the high fear and low fear 
groups for accuracy in responses. This shows a speed-accuracy trade off does not 
account for the group differences in reaction time. Results also showed that people 
were more accurate following cow cues compared to spider cues. An Image x 
Validity interaction showed that accuracy was greater following cow cues compared 
to spider cues in invalid trials, but this was not shown for valid trials. 
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For valence ratings, the two groups rated the cows similarly; however the 
high fear group rated the spiders as significantly more unpleasant than the low fear 
group. This suggests a greater dislike for spiders in the high fear group relative to the 
low fear group. Results showed that there was no difference between the groups for 
arousal ratings. This could be a result of participants not understanding exactly what 
they were rating. Participants were told to rate the images based on the physiological 
arousal they induce. Perhaps if they were told specific feelings such as increased 
heart rate and sweating there may have been more objective ratings which may have 
shown a difference.  
Reaction Times 
Overall greater reaction times were found for the high fear group compared to 
the low fear group. This does not support hypervigilance as valid-spider cues did not 
facilitate the processing of the following targets. It also does not fully support 
disengagement difficulties as greater reaction times were found not only following 
invalid-spider cues, but all cues, relative to low fear controls. Previous research 
implementing the spatial cueing task has found evidence to support hypervigilance 
and disengagement difficulties through faster reaction times to valid-spider cues and 
greater reaction times to invalid-spider cues, however this was in a high trait-anxious 
sample (Koster et al., 2006). 
Trait anxiety differs to specific fear in a few key ways. Specific fear is an 
excessive, irrational fear of a particular situation or object (Choy, Fyer, & Lipsitz, 
2007) resulting in transient feelings of tension, apprehension, decreased attentional 
control and increased autonomic arousal (Ravindranadan & Thomas, 2011). While 
trait anxiety can also induce feelings of tension, apprehension, decreased attentional 
control and increased autonomic arousal, these are not transient, but rather stable 
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characteristics of personality which are displayed across a number of situations. 
Therefore, it is possible that trait anxiety and specific phobia are not directly 
comparable. Specific phobia is more closely related to state anxiety which is a 
transitory emotional state which varies in intensity depending on the situation 
(Ravindranadan & Thomas, 2011). According to Pacheco-Unguetti, Acostaa 
Marqués, and Lupiánez (2011), trait-anxious individuals display constant attention to 
threat, and thus, tend to display facilitated attention towards, and difficulty 
disengaging from, threat. In contrast, state anxious individuals place increased threat 
value on stimuli associated with a fearful situation, and thus are thought to display an 
overall increased stimulus-driven attentional processing in fearful situations 
(Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011). Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) also describe a 
decreased threshold for appraising a stimulus as threatening in people who are 
experiencing state anxiety. Considering the similarities between state anxiety and 
specific fear, the idea of an increased bottom-up processing of all environmental 
stimuli and a decreased threshold for threat-appraisal in people with state anxiety 
may apply to the present study; however this must be approached with caution. 
While high trait-anxious participants completing an emotional spatial cueing task 
display faster reaction times to valid-spider cues and greater reaction times to 
invalid-spider cues, state anxious, and thus perhaps specific fearful, individuals 
demonstrate a decreased threshold for appraising stimuli presented in the task as 
threatening which leads to an increased bottom-up processing, ultimately resulting in 
stimulus-driven cue stimuli being a distraction from the goal of reacting to the target. 
Evidence from other studies in spider fear has found evidence in support of this. 
Although not using cueing tasks, an overall increase in reaction times has 
been observed in studies that require participants with spider fear to ignore task 
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irrelevant spider distractors. For example, research has found that people with a high 
fear of spiders had greater colour naming latencies in the original Stroop task when 
there was a spider in the same room as them compared to when there was no spider 
(Kwakkenbos, Becker, & Rinck, 2010). Slowed colour naming in the spider-related 
Stroop paradigms has been attributed to a prioritised attentional processing of threat-
related information which interferes with the goal of naming the colour (Williams et 
al., 1996). Kindt and Brosschot (1997) also found that people with a phobia of 
spiders displayed greater reaction times to spider-related stimuli in pictorial and 
linguistic Stroop tasks, and this was found despite the fact that participants rated the 
pictures as more aversive than the words. This suggests that when faced with 
threatening stimuli, people with a phobia of spiders attend to, and process, stimuli in 
the environment in a general and automatic manner regardless of either its goal-
relevance or its threat-value as a result of increased bottom-up processing. This may 
explain the current study’s finding of similar reaction times to all targets regardless 
of Validity or Image; perhaps being presented with a spider stimulus resulted in the 
inability to inhibit automatic and general bottom-up processing of all cues in the task 
regardless of goal-relevance and threat-value, resulting in interference from the goal 
of quickly reacting to the target. 
The slowed reaction times to the target observed in the high fear group are 
suggestive of a disruption of Petersen and Posner’s (2012) executive network. The 
executive network involves brain regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex and 
the prefrontal cortex. The executive network is a voluntary control system that is 
involved in top-down regulation of attention; particularly, regulating the balance 
between stimulus-driven and goal-driven attention. The balance between orienting 
and executive attention depends on attentional control such that people with greater 
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attentional control have a greater influence over voluntary attention which can 
override irrelevant stimulus-driven attention (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Eysenck et 
al., 2007). Inhibition and shifting are two particular functions of the executive 
network which are vital during attentional control; (Miyake et al., 2000). Inhibition 
refers to the ability to suppress automatic or prepotent responses that are task-
irrelevant, whereas shifting refers to the strategic shifting of attention between tasks 
(Miyake et al., 2000). According to the attentional control theory, the ability to 
inhibit task-irrelevant stimuli is essential to avoid interference from distracting 
stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Consistent with attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), the present 
results are suggestive of an increased influence of stimulus-driven attentional 
processing and a decreased influence of goal-driven processing, such that the ventral 
fronto-parietal network may have overridden the dorsal fronto-parietal network’s 
goal-directed attention when stimuli perceived as threatening were detected in the 
environment (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Considering that the reaction times of the 
high fear group were longer, even for the valid trials, the current results are 
indicative of a deficit in executive functioning. It is possible that the high fear group 
were not able to regulate the automatic processing of cues, which ultimately resulted 
in interference of goal-relevant processing.  
Although not displayed through greater reaction times to invalid-spider cues 
relative to low fear controls, disengagement difficulties may still be evident in the 
present findings. Matlow, Gard and Berg (2012) suggest that rather than impairment 
in the shifting of attention to task-relevant stimuli, the mechanisms underlying 
delayed disengaging are impairment in responding as a result of interference; that is, 
participants with anxiety have trouble disengaging attention from threat which is 
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manifested as an interference in response execution. Using a dot-probe task with 
threatening, positive and neutral images, Matlow et al. found that high trait-anxious 
individuals had greater reaction times to trials in which the probe appeared on the 
opposite side of the threatening image, relative to trials in which probes appear in the 
same location as the threatening image, and trials in which there are no threatening 
images. This was interpreted as showing disengagement difficulties. To further 
understand the mechanisms that underlie disengagement difficulties, results from an 
electrooculogram recording did not show a slowed shifting of visual attention away 
from the threatening images to the goal-relevant target. From this, Matlow et al. 
interpreted the results as being a deficit of the executive network resulting from 
enhanced attentional engagement towards, and mental processing of, the threatening 
stimulus which ultimately led to subsequent delays in the decision making and 
response execution processes of the executive system.  
If delayed disengagement is demonstrated through interference, then it could 
be argued that the results of the current study do support delayed disengaging. This 
would be consistent with the attention maintenance theory. That is, the results 
demonstrate a possible slowed disengagement from threat such that an increased 
dwell time on threatening stimuli can result in the inability to inhibit the processing 
of threatening distractors (Fox et al., 2001). Of course, this must be interpreted with 
caution as specific fear differs from trait anxiety. No solid conclusion can be made 
until these findings are replicated in participants with specific fear. 
In contrast, Mogg, Holmes, Garner, and Bradley (2008) suggest that 
hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties are two separate processes from 
interference. Mogg et al. claim that the spatial cueing task and the dot-probe task do 
not provide a distinction between slowed reaction times due to interference from the 
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threat as seems apparent in the present study, and the hypothesised effects of threat-
related attentional cueing, that is, slowed responses to invalid-spider cues and faster 
responses to valid-spider cues. Mogg et al. found increased reaction times to invalid-
spider cues but similar responses to valid-spider cues in a high anxious sample 
relative to low anxious participants. However, once determining how much of the 
reaction times were due to interference-related response slowing by subtracting 
differences in results in an endogenous cueing task (a task with a single threat image 
presented in the middle of the screen, so that shifting of attention could account for 
the results) from results in an exogenous cueing task (with cues either side of the 
fixation, similar to the present study), they found that high anxious participants 
showed faster reaction times on valid-threat trials and not invalid-threat trials (Mogg 
et al., 2008). It was suggested that response slowing could also be due to a freezing 
response in the presence of fear. 
These results could relate to the present study to explain the failure to find 
hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties in behavioural data. Perhaps the 
requirement to produce an overt response to the target required a decision making 
process which measured executive function rather than automatic, involuntary, 
bottom-up attentional biases (Matlow et al., 2012). Based on this this response 
slowing tendency evidenced in the spatial cueing task, future research should look 
into paradigms which assess hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties without 
the possibility of response slowing. 
P1 Component 
The finding of greater P1 amplitude for the high fear group for all targets is 
not concordant with previous research that has found that people with a high fear of 
spiders display greater P1 amplitude to threatening relative to neutral trials 
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(Venettacci, 2014). Other researchers have found a general increase of the P1 
component to spider as well as neutral stimuli. For example, in a colour and object 
identification task requiring participants to discriminate between, or identify the 
colour of, spider and flower stimuli, Kolassa et al. (2006) found greater P1 amplitude 
for the identification of both spiders and flowers in participants with a high fear of 
spiders relative to controls. Similarly, Michalowski et al. (2009) found that high fear 
participants had greater P1 amplitudes for both phobia-relevant, as well as standard 
threatening, positive and neutral images, in a passive picture-viewing task when 
compared to low-fear controls. Considering that the P1 component is modulated by 
attention, and is thought to reflect involuntary orienting and enhanced early visual 
processing (Fu et al., 2005; Hillyard et al., 1994), the finding of increased P1 
amplitude for both spider and cow cues is suggestive of a general hypervigilance to 
all environmental stimuli, such that attention was automatically oriented to all cues in 
the task during early visual processing. Although it was predicted that P1 amplitude 
following cow cues would be similar for the high fear group compared to the low 
fear group, there was a trend for significance with a strong effect size (p=.06, d=.83) 
suggesting that the high fear group displayed higher P1 amplitude following cow 
cues than the low fear group. Considering the sample size was relatively small, this 
may be a lack of power. Taken together, the between groups and within groups 
results may suggest that the high fear group displayed increased P1 for all cues 
relative to controls who only showed increased P1 to spiders which reinforces the 
idea of general hypervigilance. 
Future research could investigate the P1 component in a spider fearful sample 
to observe whether increased P1 amplitude is displayed when there are no spiders in 
the task. This would provide insight into whether the observed threat in the current 
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study resulted in the participants displaying a general hypervigilance, or whether 
they always display general hypervigilance regardless of perceived threat. If specific 
fear is similar to state anxiety, they should display a general hypervigilance, indexed 
by increased P1, only in the presence of fearful stimuli. 
Although expected for the high fear group, greater occipital P1 amplitude for 
valid-spider cued targets compared to cow cued targets was observed in the low fear 
group. Additionally, between groups analysis showed that the low fear group did not 
significantly differ from the high fear group in P1 amplitude to targets following 
spider cues. This may suggest that enhanced early orienting processes for spider 
targets were demonstrated by both groups. An increased P1 amplitude observed in 
the control group could be indexing enhanced visual processing of potentially 
dangerous stimuli. Enhanced visual processing of danger is consistent with the 
threat-superiority effect which refers to the way in which attention is captured more 
easily by stimuli that are associated with fear or danger compared to non-threatening 
stimuli (Öhman et al., 2001). Enhanced attentional processing of threat-related 
stimuli is thought to be an evolutionary process that is associated with a greater 
chance of survival (Brown, El-Deredy, & Blanchette, 2010). Öhman et al. (2001) 
proposed a neural circuitry referred to as the ‘fear module’ that constantly scans the 
environment for potential dangers that require a fast and automatic response. This 
theory posits that this effect occurs for any stimuli, including spiders, which would 
have been potentially dangerous in the time of the fear module’s evolution (Brown et 
al., 2010). 
Behavioural evidence has shown that evolutionarily-relevant spider stimuli 
guide attentional processes in healthy participants. Using a visual search task, 
Blanchette (2006) and Öhman et al. (2001) found that participants were faster to 
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determine whether an evolutionarily threatening target stimulus was in the same 
category, or a discrepant category, from a grid of threat or neutral-stimuli. There is 
no research into the occipital P1 ERP indexing early enhanced visual processing in 
evolutionarily-relevant spider stimuli. However, there is evidence that evolutionarily-
relevant facial expressions presented in a dot-probe task are associated with an 
enhanced P1 component in healthy participants (Schuller & Rossion, 2004). 
ERP results did not show evidence of disengagement difficulties as the Group 
x Validity x Image interaction for P1 amplitude was non-significant. There was no 
evidence for decreased P1 amplitude for the high fear group for invalid trials, or any 
trials for that matter. There have been no previous studies to determine the 
underlying ERP correlates of disengagement difficulties. It is possible that this was 
not observed in the current study because the P1 component is not modulated by 
disengagement difficulties. Finally, the ERPs were-time locked to the target. The P1 
may have indexed orienting to the target rather than the cue. Different peaks may 
have been observed had the ERPs been time-locked to the threatening cue. Delayed 
disengagement is also more evident in participants with low-attentional control. 
Peers and Lawrence (2009) conducted a rapid serial visual presentation task, which 
required them to watch a series of emotional images presented one-by-one whilst 
looking out for a target and reacting to it as fast as possible. They found that 
participants with high self-reported anxiety demonstrated greater difficulty with 
disengaging attention from previous threatening distractor images to respond to the 
target image if they had self-reported poor attentional control whereas those with 
high anxiety who had good attentional control did not demonstrate difficulty in 
disengaging attention. Considering the participants in the current study were not 
asked to report on their perceived attentional control, there may have been an 
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imbalance between the groups on ability to regulate attention. Thus disengagement 
difficulties in people with a fear of spiders may have been masked by good 
attentional control in the high fear group compared to the low fear group (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010). Further research should include a measure of perceived behavioural 
such as the Attentional Control Scale (Ólafsson et al., 2011) to balance this between 
the groups. 
Limitations 
There were limitations in the sample used in the current study. For example, 
there were only 23 participants which were split into high and low fear based on a 
median split. Thus it is possible that there was not enough difference in spider fear 
between the groups to observe the true effect of high spider fear. A more effective 
way of analysing differences would be to have a much larger screening sample and 
take the top 10% and the bottom 10% in terms of spider fear scores for the high and 
low groups respectively (Koster et al., 2006). Further, compared to previous research 
this study is relatively underpowered and stronger effects may be found with more 
participants. Additionally, the sample in the current study was non-clinical and 
results must be interpreted with caution when generalising to specific phobia. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The present study investigated behavioural and electrophysiological 
correlates of hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties by means of a spatial 
cueing paradigm. The high spider fear group displayed generally greater reaction 
times and similar P1 amplitude following all cues, whereas the low fear group had 
quicker reaction times and increased P1 amplitude to targets following spider cues. 
Taken together, the behavioural and ERP data provide evidence of two processes 
occurring throughout the task for the high fear participants. The ERP data 
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demonstrated early visual processing differences between the high and low fear 
groups that were not evident in overt responses (Luck, 1995), whereas the 
behavioural data demonstrated later, higher-order response deficits (Matlow et al., 
2012). The current results were indicative of an early general hypervigilance to all 
incoming stimuli among high fear participants regardless of whether it was 
threatening or neutral. This generalised hypervigilance may have resulted in deficits 
in later attentional processes in the executive network such that an increased dwell 
time on cues resulted in interference in responses to the target, as displayed in greater 
reactions times elicited by the high fear group compared to the low fear group. 
Combined, the present study suggests an increased hypervigilance to cues has 
possibly resulted in deficits in inhibiting the processing of the cues to react only to 
the target. This finding is consistent with the attentional control theory (Eysenck et 
al., 2007) which posits that a lack of attentional control results in a lowered ability to 
complete tasks without interference from irrelevant stimuli. This is the first study to 
find evidence of a general hypervigilance followed by interference in a sample with 
specific fear. These findings are only preliminary and warrant further research to 
determine whether hypervigilance and disengagement difficulties are observed 
alongside a later interference effect. For example, paradigms that measure orienting 
separately from reactions to targets that require a response decision would be 
appropriate to analyse the orienting biases without effects of executive function. The 
current results yield treatment implications. For example, treatment programs should 
focus on decreasing general hypervigilance as well as focussing on the feared object 
to eliminate the interference of general, yet distracting, goal-irrelevant threats. 
Perhaps desensitisation for people with a fear of spiders should be paired with 
attentional control tasks such as mixed attention training - which involves training in 
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sustained attention, selective attention, task switching and inhibition (Wass, Scerif, & 
Johnson, 2012) - in order to learn to consciously focus attention onto goals rather 
than irrelevant environmental stimuli in the presence of spiders. 
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Appendix B 
Participant Information and Consent 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Spider Fear, Brain Activity, and Attention 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study into the effects of spider fear on 
attention during the viewing of spider images. This is an Honours study being 
conducted by Isabel Hoystead, Amber Johnstone, and Shelley Flynn under the 
supervision of Dr Allison Matthews (Chief Investigator, School of Medicine, 
Psychology). 
1. ‘What is the purpose of this study?’ 
The purpose is to investigate brain processes involved in attentional processing 
among males and females with high and low spider fear. 
2. ‘Why have I been invited to participate in this study?’ 
You are eligible to participate in this study because you have an intense fear of 
spiders or that you have a relatively low of fear spiders. 
3. ‘What does this study involve?’ 
This study will require you to attend one session (approximately 2 hours) at the 
University of Tasmania. In this session you will complete some questionnaires 
relating to your fear of spiders. You will then complete some computer tasks where 
you will respond (using a button press) to particular aspects of visual stimuli 
presented on a computer screen. These stimuli may include pictures, letters or 
objects (and may include pictures of spiders). Your brain activity will be measured 
while you complete these tasks.  
It is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is voluntary. 
While we would be pleased to have you participate, we respect your right to 
decline. There will be no consequences to you if you decide not to participate, and 
this will not affect your relationship with the University. If you decide to 
discontinue participation at any time, you may do so without providing an 
explanation. All information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your 
name will not be used in any publication arising out of the research. All of the 
research will be kept in a locked cabinet in the office of Dr Allison Matthews or on a 
secure server at the University of Tasmania. 
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4. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
You may or may not experience anxiety during the course of the study. However, if 
you do, it is hoped that you will notice a reduction in your anxiety after a certain 
period of time. The results of this study will provide valuable information on the 
attentional processes involved in spider fear and will help us to further develop an 
online treatment program for people with phobias. 
5. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
If you experience anxiety during the study, this may be unpleasant and include 
emotions of fear and worrying thoughts, wishing to avoid the situation, physical 
discomforts such as palpitations, sweating and over-breathing. The researchers will 
provide you with information for coping with these symptoms if they unduly 
trouble you. However, if you find that you are becoming distressed or experience 
significantly elevated levels of anxiety you will be advised to receive support from a 
clinician or alternatively, we will arrange for you to see a counsellor at no expense 
to you.. 
There are no specific risks associated with the measurement of brain activity. 
However, if you have sensitive skin there is a small possibility of a slight skin 
reaction from electrode preparation materials. If you believe there is a chance that 
your skin may react you are advised to reconsider participation.  
6. What if I have questions about this research? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, or require further assistance 
with your fear of spiders after the study is completed, please feel free to contact Dr 
Allison Matthews on (03) 62267236, who would be happy to discuss any aspect of 
the research with you. Once we have analysed the information we will be putting a 
summary of our findings on the School of Psychology website for you to view. You 
are welcome to contact us at that time to discuss any issue relating to the research 
study. 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research 
Ethics Committee.  If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on (03) 
6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the person 
nominated to receive complaints from research participants. You will need to quote 
[H0011104]. 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. If you wish to take part in it, 
please sign the attached consent form. This information sheet is for you to keep. 
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  CONSENT FORM 
Spider Fear, Brain Activity, and Attention 
  
1. I have read and understood the 'Information Sheet' for this project. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves attending one session (approx. 2 hours) at 
the University of Tasmania whereby I will complete some questionnaires and 
some computer based attention tasks. These tasks may involve responding to 
pictures (including spiders), letters, or objects and brain activity will be 
monitored throughout the process.  
4. I understand that participation involves some risk of experiencing a 
heightened level of anxiety; however, the researcher will be present at all 
times, I will be given information on how to cope with anxiety, and I will be 
referred to a counsellor if need be. I understand that measurement of brain 
activity involves minimal risk, and slight skin irritation may occur if I have 
sensitive skin. 
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for ten years and will then be destroyed. 
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published 
provided that I cannot be identified as a participant.  
8. I understand that the researchers will maintain my identity confidential and 
that any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the 
purposes of the research.  
9. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw 
at any time without any effect, and if I so wish, may request that any data I 
have supplied to date be withdrawn from the research. 
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
 
Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project & the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe 
that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation  
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, 
the following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so 
participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
Name of Investigator  
Signature of Investigator  
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Appendix C 
Experimental Session Questionnaire 
 
Note to interviewer: When booking, ask participant not to consume caffeine (2 hrs), 
tobacco (2hrs), alcohol (24 hours) and illicit drugs (none) prior to session, and let them 
know that they may have some residual electrode gel in their hair when they leave the 
session 
Experimental session questions  
(To be completed on the day of the experimental session) 
Date ____/____/____        Participant 
ID ____________ 
1. Check that participant has abstained from alcohol for 24 hours and illicit drug use 
since completing the screening questionnaire 
3. How many cups of coffee (or any other caffeinated drinks/products) have you 
consumed today? _____  
If > 0. How many hours since your last caffeinated drink ______ hours 
4. Have you had any tobacco or nicotine products today? Yes / No  
If yes, how many cigarettes (or nicotine products) have you had today? ____ 
If yes, How many hours since your last cigarette (nicotine product) ______ hours 
5.  Have you consumed any medications in the past week (or any prescribed 
medications since completing the screening questionnaire)? 
If yes, please detail:  
6. Approximately how many hours sleep did you have last night? ____ 
Karolinska sleepiness scale (participant can self-complete) 
Please circle on the following scale of 1 to 9 how you feel AT THE PRESENT MOMENT: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Medication Number of 
occasions 
Time since last used Estimated dose 
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Very 
alert 
 Alert – 
normal 
level 
 Neither 
alert nor 
sleepy 
 Sleepy – 
but no 
effort to 
stay 
awake 
 Very 
sleepy, 
great 
effort to 
stay 
awake, 
fighting 
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Appendix D 
Computer Game Usage 
 
Date: ___________________ Participant: __________ 
 
Video Gaming Experience Questionnaire 
We are interested in how often you play video games, and may use this information 
to examine the effects of video game playing on visual attention and motor skills. 
 
How often would you normally play video games? Please choose one response. 
 
Never play video games 
Rarely play video games (less than 2 hours a month) 
Occasionally play video games (between 30 minutes and 2 hours a week) 
Regularly play video games (between 2 hours and 5 hours a week) 
Often play video games (more than 5 hours a week) 
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Appendix E 
Menstrual Cycle 
Date:          Participant: 
 
What was the date of the first day of your last period?  If you don't 
remember the exact date you can give an approximate range (e.g. 5-8 
May): 
 
  
 
               
 
 
          
 
 
